Approved For Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP80B01676R000400080026 4 COLLARS REGISTRY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH WASHINGTON

SECRET

APR 2 3 1964

25X1

25X1

Dear John,

In late June of last year USIB approved NIE 4-63, The Likelihood and Consequences of a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems. Since that time we have obtained new information on the nuclear programs of two countries, that would change somewhat the conclusions of 4-63. There may also be significant new data on the programs of other countries treated in the estimate, being one example.

We would like, therefore, to see a new Nth country estimate scheduled for the third quarter of 1964, perhaps in late summer after the annual Soviet AE estimate is finished. We suggest that the estimate concentrate on capabilities and intentions of non-communist countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons, since the implications and consequences section that appeared last year remains generally valid. Our suggested terms of reference are attached.

Sincerely,

Thomas L. Hughes

Enclosure:

Suggested Terms of Reference

Mr. John McCone,
Director of Central Intelligence,
CIA Headquarters,
Lengley, Virginia.

State Department review completed

Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CARDP80B01676R000400080026-4

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/01/15: CIA-RDP80B01676R000400080026-4

SECRET

<u>Draft Terms of Reference</u>: Likelihood of a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Before 1970

The Problem

To assess the capabilities and intentions of non-communist countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons over about the next five years.

Questions Bearing on the Problem

- 1. What countries now have an adequate technological and scientific base for the development before 1970 of a nuclear weapon and what are their intentions in this regard?
- 2. To what extent are these countries deficient in materials, equipment or scientific talent that might require or make desirable outside assistance?
- 3. If outside assistance were necessary for specific countries, what would be the problems -- or lack of them -- in their obtaining it?
- 1. What inhibiting effect, if any, might the test ban have on weapon development by Nth country signatories?
- 5. Is clandestine weapon development a realistic possibility over the next five years?
- 6. What technological developments are in sight that might make weapon development easier?
- 7. What would be the cost of a token weapons program, excluding delivery systems, i.e., a few fission weapons a year? Of a more ambitious program?

25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400080026-4